Se analiza la interpretación escotista de algunos textos aristotélicos para establecer la contraposición entre naturaleza y voluntad. La posición de Escoto implica una reivindicación de la contingencia frente a la necesidad, de la acción frente a la ciencia. Es decir, la distinción entre naturaleza y voluntad le aboca a proponer una ontología en la que el ser contingente precede al ser necesario. El saber de la ciencia que establece las regularidades necesarias de la naturaleza queda subordinado al saber de la (...) acción humana. Se tiene especialmente presente las Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, IX, q. 15. (shrink)

This article looks at several characteristics of intellectual understanding according to Philo Judaeus from three perspectives: the first is that intellectual understanding is primarily attention, the second is that understanding doesn't imply appropriation, but rather apparition and presence, and finally that it is always expression of otherness and knowledge of difference.

There is a central doctrine in Aristotle that usually isn’t recognized in its importance: the affirmation of the difference and the plurality. In the course of the centuries, Aristotelism lost which was perhaps its most characteristic and specific feature versus Platonism, that is, its criticism of unity and its defense of plurality. The first principle is not the One but the plurality. The horizon of thinking is not the unity but the diversity of the logos. The unity of the logos (...) presupposes the differences within reality. Heidegger attracted attention to the peculiarity of the practical philosophy of Aristotle. It was the case of dialectics, rhetoric, poetics, ethics, politics, etc. We are referring to knowledges that are art rather than science. Nothing is so differentiated as human action, as it is always performed from a new starting point. Dialectic and rhetorical speeches are always circumscribed to the individual. (shrink)

By giving the proper emphasis to both radical skepticism and naturalism as two independent standpoints in Hume, I wish to propose a more satisfactory account of some of the more puzzling Humean claims on causation. I place these claims alternatively in either the philosophical standpoint of the radical skeptic or in the standpoint of everyday and scientific beliefs. I characterize Hume’s radical skeptical standpoint in relation to Hume’s perceptual model of the traditional theory of ideas, and I argue that Hume‘s (...) radical skeptical argument concerning our causal inferences is inextricably linked to his skeptical argument concerning our idea of a necessary connection between cause and effect. I discuss Hume’s naturalistic account of the origin of our idea of necessity and offer a new reading of Hume’s two “definitions” of cause. I argue along the way against central aspects of two opposing styles of interpretation---Norman Kemp Smith’s and Annette Baier’s, on the one hand, and Robert Fogelin’s, on the other---that in my view do not appreciate the mutual autonomy of radical skepticism and naturalism in Hume. (shrink)

En el presente artículo, exploramos diversos interrogantes relacionados con la construcción de las sexualidades mediáticas mapeando las formas en que los medios masivos de comunicación y las tecnologías de la información y la comunicación forman, conforman, crean, re-crean y reproducen las sexualidades hoy, comprendiendo que ninguna sexualización queda por fuera de la política y lo normado. Profundizamos en quiénes son seres sexuados en los medios masivos de comunicación (en adelante, MMC), quiénes tienen derecho a visibilizar su sexualidad y si existen (...) diferencias en la sexualización de mujeres y hombres, heterosexuales y homosexuales, personas blancas y negras. Igualmente, ahondamos en el análisis de la construcción de sí como ser sexual y sexuado a través de las redes sociales, reality shows y otros tipos de plataformas actuales, que desestabilizan las fronteras entre lo público y lo privado al cambiar los regímenes de visibilidad de sí y de los/as otros/as. Partiendo del análisis de contenido de los mensajes mediáticos, buscamos comprender e interpretar las sexualidades dominantes y reflexionar sobre los cuerpos sexuados marginados de los MMC. Igualmente, a partir del marco conceptual y de una sistematización de la legislación vigente en la región y en el mundo, proponemos formas de escapar de las nuevas formas de producción y reproducción de desigualdad. (shrink)

We argue that the notion of individual is controversial not only for indistinguishable particles but also in the case of quantum distinguishable systems. We also argue that not only a picture in which “actual individuals” are taken into account is in contradiction with the quantum formalism, but also the case of “possible individuals” turns inconsistent within the quantum realm.

This paper wants to elucidate the meaning of "order of transcendentals". That matter has a preferential place in L. Polo's philosophy. This study is carried out through an analysis of concept of "meaning" and specially "the meaning of being".

This article looks at several characteristics of intellectual understanding according to Philo Judaeus from three perspectives: the first is that intellectual understanding is primarily attention, the second is that understanding doesn't imply appropriation, but rather apparition and presence, and finally that it is always expression of otherness and knowledge of difference.

In the framework of the topos approach to quantum mechanics we give a representation of physical properties in terms of modal operators on Heyting algebras. It allows us to introduce a classical type study of the mentioned properties.

Hume’s discussion of space, time, and mathematics at T 1.2 appeared to many earlier commentators as one of the weakest parts of his philosophy. From the point of view of pure mathematics, for example, Hume’s assumptions about the infinite may appear as crude misunderstandings of the continuum and infinite divisibility. I shall argue, on the contrary, that Hume’s views on this topic are deeply connected with his radically empiricist reliance on phenomenologically given sensory images. He insightfully shows that, working within (...) this epistemological model, we cannot attain complete certainty about the continuum but only at most about discrete quantity. Geometry, in contrast to arithmetic, cannot be a fully exact science. A number of more recent commentators have offered sympathetic interpretations of Hume’s discussion aiming to correct the older tendency to dismiss this part of the Treatise as weak and confused. Most of these commentators interpret Hume as anticipating the contemporary idea of a finite or discrete geometry. They view Hume’s conception that space is composed of simple indivisible minima as a forerunner of the conception that space is a discretely (rather than continuously) ordered set. This approach, in my view, is helpful as far as it goes, but there are several important features of Hume’s discussion that are not sufficiently appreciated. I go beyond these recent commentators by emphasizing three of Hume’s most original contributions. First, Hume’s epistemological model invokes the “confounding” of indivisible minima to explain the appearance of spatial continuity. Second, Hume’s sharp contrast between the perfect exactitude of arithmetic and the irremediable inexactitude of geometry reverses the more familiar conception of the early modern tradition in pure mathematics, according to which geometry (the science of continuous quantity) has its own standard of equality that is independent from and more exact than any corresponding standard supplied by algebra and arithmetic (the sciences of discrete quantity). Third, Hume has a developed explanation of how geometry (traditional Euclidean geometry) is nonetheless possible as an axiomatic demonstrative science possessing considerably more exactitude and certainty that the “loose judgements” of the vulgar. (shrink)

In this paper we attempt to physically interpret the Modal Kochen–Specker theorem. In order to do so, we analyze the features of the possible properties of quantum systems arising from the elements in an orthomodular lattice and distinguish the use of “possibility” in the classical and quantum formalisms. Taking into account the modal and many worlds non-collapse interpretation of the projection postulate, we discuss how the MKS theorem rules the constraints to actualization, and thus, the relation between actual and possible (...) realms. (shrink)

Hume follows Newton in replacing the mechanical philosophy’s demonstrative ideal of science by the Principia’s ideal of inductive proof ; in this respect, Hume differs sharply from Locke. Hume is also guided by Newton’s own criticisms of the mechanical philosophers’ hypotheses. The first stage of Hume’s skeptical argument concerning causation targets central tenets of the mechanical philosophers’ conception of causation, all of which rely on the a priori postulation of a hidden configuration of primary qualities. The skeptical argument concerning the (...) causal inductive inference then raises doubts about what Hume himself regards as our very best inductive method. Hume’s own “Rules” further substantiate his reliance on Newton. Finally, Locke’s distinction between “Knowledge” and “Probability” does not leave room for Hume’s Newtonian notion of inductive proof. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.3 (2001) 351-383 [Access article in PDF] Hume's Pyrrhonian Skepticism and the Belief in Causal Laws Graciela De Pierris Hume endorses in no uncertain terms the normative use of causal reasoning. The most striking example of this commitment is Hume's argument in the Enquiry against the possibility of miracles. The argument sanctions, in particular, the use of scientific reflection on uniform experience (...) issuing in causal laws of nature (E 114): "A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined." 1 These words should give us pause; for how can Hume so confidently say, after his skeptical conclusions concerning our causal beliefs, that "a firm and unalterable experience has established" the laws of nature, and that we can therefore produce "proofs" against miracles? The Treatise gives rise to the same puzzle. In this text, too, Hume confidently prescribes methodical reflection based on causal reasoning. For example, in Book One, Part Three, Section Fifteen, Hume offers eight "Rules by which to judge of causes and effects." These rules are more than descriptions of our natural causal inferences. They are meant to guide us in making better causal inferences; in Hume's words they "ought to regulate" our probable reasoning since (T 149): "by them we learn to distinguish the accidental circumstances from the efficacious causes." 2Moreover, Hume consistently takes Newtonian science as a model for the proper employment of causal inferences in inquiries into matters of fact and, [End Page 351] in particular, as a model to be followed in his own science of human nature. 3 This paradigm of what the science of nature ought to be is understood by Hume as an inductive, experimental inquiry. 4 In the Enquiry, for example, Hume uses the label "sciences" for "politics, natural philosophy, physic, chemistry, &c." and in the preceding discussion argues that these sciences are not a priori but are based on causal reasoning (E 164-165). Thus, there are for Hume inquiries into matters of fact and existence that amount to more than blindly following natural propensities and habit. The sciences and many of our causal inferences in common life involve more than mere belief as a sentiment. They involve, in addition, careful reflection that results in improved causal inferences and thus provides normative standards. Yet, in thus upholding the normative use of causal reasoning in science and in everyday life, Hume appears to contradict his own radical skeptical conclusions concerning our knowledge of causation and induction. I here propose a novel way to resolve this puzzle.To acknowledge the existence of a puzzle, however, amounts to accepting the now controversial view that Hume provides, and takes at face value, a radical skeptical argument concerning our knowledge of causation and induction. 5 Moreover, the attempt to resolve this puzzle involves rejecting the suggestion [End Page 352] that Hume, without awareness or concern, happily holds flatly inconsistent views. 6 It also goes against the more sophisticated suggestion that Hume lightly alternates among different psychological moods, or perhaps different perspectives, which might eventually issue in results that contradict each other but are sufficiently localized so as to prevent serious conflict. Such a view might lead us to conceive Hume's texts as an unstructured and arbitrary patchwork of reflections, driven by different psychological moods or by the embellishments of a radiant literary style. This kind of reading is unacceptable as an interpretative tool, however, as H. J. Paton has acutely noted in his criticism of the patchwork interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. 7 For such a reading would place no constraints at all on the task of establishing which parts of Hume's text belong to which moods or perspectives. The suggestion that Hume offers an unstructured patchwork of reflections masks the novel and systematic distinction Hume draws between his radical philosophical... (shrink)

By giving the proper emphasis to both radical skepticism and naturalism as two independent standpoints in Hume, I wish to propose a more satisfactory account of some of the more puzzling Humean claims on causation. I place these claims alternatively in either the philosophical standpoint of the radical skeptic or in the standpoint of everyday and scientific beliefs. I characterize Hume’s radical skeptical standpoint in relation to Hume’s perceptual model of the traditional theory of ideas, and I argue that Hume‘s (...) radical skeptical argument concerning our causal inferences is inextricably linked to his skeptical argument concerning our idea of a necessary connection between cause and effect. I discuss Hume’s naturalistic account of the origin of our idea of necessity and offer a new reading of Hume’s two “definitions” of cause. I argue along the way against central aspects of two opposing styles of interpretation---Norman Kemp Smith’s and Annette Baier’s, on the one hand, and Robert Fogelin’s, on the other---that in my view do not appreciate the mutual autonomy of radical skepticism and naturalism in Hume. (shrink)

The COVID-19 virus was unveiled to the world as a health crisis and later also as an economic crisis. For some organisations, it has become an ethical crisis. This is certainly the case for large organisations in Australia, where the way many enterprises handled a government wage subsidy called JobKeeper led to a public backlash, media pressure, and a variety of responses ranging from ‘We acted legally’ to the full return of the subsidy. Some organisations later reported profits, and the (...) public response indicated concern about this behaviour, many considering it immoral despite it being legally compliant. It is, we contend, a question to which stakeholder theory can be applied, examining how organisations view and respond to the public. We use content analysis of mainstream media to provide information about public reactions and information from official sources to confirm corporate action. We show that there is a significant ethical component in the public response to the behaviour of organisations as they respond to the crisis. COVID has been an ethical, health, and financial crisis for these organisations. Public pressure, exerted in and through the media, made the general public a definite stakeholder. (shrink)

The modem rationalist tradition initiated by Descartes has as one of its central tenets the independence of the human understanding from the senses. Regardless of the different ways in which independence from experience is understood, there is much common ground among the modem views on the a priori. Yet Kant, culminating this tradition, introduces an entirely new conception of the a priori never before articulated in the history of philosophy. This is the notion of elements in knowledge which are independent (...) of experience but nevertheless closely connected, in a special way, with experience.Although for Kant the a priori has a privileged position in the structure of knowledge - as it has for other modem rationalist philosophers - one of the most striking, and often neglected, aspect of his conception of the a priori is the great extent to which it is opposed to foundationalism. (shrink)

In Mexico, significant ethical and social issues have been raised by the COVID-19 pandemic. Some of the most pressing issues are the extent of restrictive measures, the reciprocal duties to healthcare workers, the allocation of scarce resources, and the need for research. While policy and ethical frameworks are being developed to face these problems, the gender perspective has been largely overlooked in most of the issues at stake. Domestic violence is the most prevalent form of violence against women, which can (...) be exacerbated during a pandemic: stress and economic uncertainty are triggers for abuse, and confinement limits access to support networks. Confinement also exacerbates the unfair distribution of unpaid labor, which is disproportionately assigned to women and girls, and highlights inequality in the overall labor market. Lack of security measures has resulted in attacks towards health workers, particularly female nurses, due to fear of contamination. Finally, resource results in lack of access to other health necessities, including sexual and reproductive health services. Research across all disciplines to face—and to learn from—this crisis should be done through a gender lens, because understanding the realities of women is essential to understand the pandemic’s true effects in Mexico and the world. (shrink)

Este trabajo se ocupa de la crítica de Platón a oradores, poetas y sofistas. Su propósito es mostrar que independientemente de las características que singularizan una batalla de vasto alcance librada por el filósofo en tres frentes distintos, la noción de imitación (mimesis) proporciona un hilo conductor que permite vincular esos diferentes enfrentamientos y arrojar luz sobre la reacción de Platón ante quienes identifica, peyorativamente, como imitadores. La práctica adulatoria del orador en Gorgias, no menos que el quehacer del poeta (...) puesto en tela de juicio en República y el del sofista en el diálogo homónimo tendrían, en efecto, una naturaleza mimética. Esto no impide reconocer, junto a los puntos de continuidad, diferencias significativas en los tratamientos de la mimesis que ofrecen los tres diálogos aquí considerados. (shrink)

El derecho a migrar, como el derecho a la salud del migrante, se encuentran reconocidos en la Ley de Migraciones Nro. 25871/2003 de Argentina. Dicha ley constituye un avance legislativo en derechos humanos; resultado de un largo proceso constituyente, deliberativo, que dio lugar a un modelo inclusivo de migración sin precedentes internacionales en su momento. Sin embargo, recientemente asistimos a un giro en políticas migratorias (DNU 70/2017). Como consecuencia, se produce un retroceso en derechos sociales y políticos. En lo que (...) hace al derecho a la salud, la instauración de políticas neoconservadoras (Cobertura Universal de la Salud –CUS-) impulsó leyes provinciales (Ley 6119/2019) destinadas a exigir seguros pagos de salud para migrantes, contrarios a nuestra constitución. El objetivo del presente trabajo es analizar las raíces de éstos cambios en las normativas citadas sobre migraciones y salud; aplicando un marco de justicia social que nos permita comprender, críticamente, cómo la bifurcación de políticas distributivas y de reconocimiento en las mismas legislaciones habilitó el desarrollo de políticas neoconservadoras impuestas a través de decretos autoritarios; cuyas consecuencias trascienden la esfera de los migrantes, haciendo peligrar al mismo sistema de salud argentino como bien público. (shrink)

The objective of the work is to analyze the intersectional discriminations that operate in the multiple identities of regional migrant women in the field of health in Argentina during the present pandemic. We will begin with the critical study of key categories and the origin of the inequalities of law of the aforementioned discrimination in migration policies. Second, we will address de facto inequalities, particularly examining the socio-economic inequalities suffered by migrants during the pandemic. Thirdly, in order to enable alternative (...) forms of care and self-care from the recognition of their ethnicity and the inseparable care of the earth, we propose the application of the concept of territorial participatory justice as a condition of intercultural dialogue in health. As a proposal, it seeks to promote dialogues of knowledge located outside the bureaucratic councils and expanding the social base of health rights from the pluriculturality exercised in care networks of migrant women in the territory and not from their domesticated participation. (shrink)

The closely related debates concerning abortion, the protection of the embryo and stem cell science have captured the legislative agenda in Mexico in recent years. This paper examines some contemporary debates related to stem cell science and the legal and political action that has followed in the wake of the latest Supreme Court judgment on abortion, which debates are directly linked to the degrees of protection of the embryo stipulated in the Mexican Constitution. While some Mexican states have opted to (...) take no further action, others, where conservative political forces are in the majority, have been very active in seeking to ensure that their constitutions are amended to protect human life from conception onwards. This intense legislative activity has not, however, been repeated at the federal level, where there is currently no overarching national regulatory framework governing stem cell research. Although major efforts have been made by the conservative block within the Senate to bring forward legislative proposals for the prohibition of human embryonic stem cell research, and despite the public expression by the federal government of its commitment to encourage inward investment and innovation in the area of biotechnology, stem cell science has, so far, remained unregulated. The legislative challenge is to resist the pressure that has been injected by religious leaders and to act in accordance with the values and principles adopted by the community in the Mexican Constitution. In the final analysis, Mexico faces particular difficulties in accommodating conservative political forces on one hand, while recognising on the other its need, as an emerging economy, to promote a progressive approach to innovation in biotechnology. (shrink)

"Epistemology Naturalized" has been extremely influential among contemporary analytical epistemologists. Current discussions about Quine's thesis do not pay attention to a basic point: his main argument is a historical one. Quine tries to show that a naturalized epistemology is the best way out vis-a-vis the failures of traditional epistemology. In this paper, I argue that Quine's argument is based on a fictions historical account. lf that is the case, his reasons for a naturalizcd epistemology are non-sutficient.

Introducción al Dossier "Bioética después de la COVID-19. Derecho a la salud y garantía de bienes públicos en el contexto post-pandemia".